Some people hear voices that others do not, but only some of those people seek treatment. Using a Pavlovian learning task, we induced conditioned hallucinations in four groups of people who differed orthogonally in their voice-hearing and treatment-seeking statuses. People who hear voices were significantly more susceptible to the effect. Using functional neuroimaging and computational modeling of perception, we identified processes that differentiated voice-hearers from non-voice-hearers and treatmentseekers from non-treatment-seekers and characterized a brain circuit that mediated the conditioned hallucinations. These data demonstrate the profound and sometimes pathological impact of top-down cognitive processes on perception and may represent an objective means to discern people with a need for treatment from those without. P erception is not simply the passive reception of inputs (1). We actively infer the causes of our sensations (2). These inferences are influenced by our prior experiences (3). Priors and inputs might be combined according to Bayes' rule (4). Prediction errors, the mismatch between priors and inputs, contribute to belief updating (5). Hallucinations (percepts without external stimulus) may arise when strong priors cause a percept in the absence of input (6). We tested this theory by engendering new priors about auditory stimuli in human observers using Pavlovian conditioning.
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Some people hear voices that others do not, but only some of those people seek treatment. Using a Pavlovian learning task, we induced conditioned hallucinations in four groups of people who differed orthogonally in their voice-hearing and treatment-seeking statuses. People who hear voices were significantly more susceptible to the effect. Using functional neuroimaging and computational modeling of perception, we identified processes that differentiated voice-hearers from non-voice-hearers and treatmentseekers from non-treatment-seekers and characterized a brain circuit that mediated the conditioned hallucinations. These data demonstrate the profound and sometimes pathological impact of top-down cognitive processes on perception and may represent an objective means to discern people with a need for treatment from those without. P erception is not simply the passive reception of inputs (1) . We actively infer the causes of our sensations (2) . These inferences are influenced by our prior experiences (3) . Priors and inputs might be combined according to Bayes' rule (4) . Prediction errors, the mismatch between priors and inputs, contribute to belief updating (5) . Hallucinations (percepts without external stimulus) may arise when strong priors cause a percept in the absence of input (6) . We tested this theory by engendering new priors about auditory stimuli in human observers using Pavlovian conditioning.
Even in healthy individuals, the repeated cooccurrence of visual and auditory stimuli can induce auditory hallucinations (7) . We examined this effect with functional imaging. Some argue that in patients with psychosis, weak priors lead to aberrant prediction errors, resulting in auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) (8) . Others have observed strong priors in patients, but the effects were not specific to hallucinations (9, 10) . Such inconsistencies may reflect the hierarchical organization of perception: Perturbations may affect some levels of the hierarchy and not others (9) . We used computational modeling to infer the strength of participants' hierarchical perceptual beliefs from their behavioral responses during conditioning (11) . Our model captured how priors are combined with sensory evidence, allowing us to test the strong-prior hypothesis directly.
Participants worked to detect a 1-kHz tone occurring concurrently with presentation of a checkerboard visual stimulus. First, we determined individual thresholds for detection and psychometric curves (12) . Then, at the start of conditioning, the tone was presented frequently at threshold (Fig. 1A, left) , engendering a belief in audio-visual association. This belief was then tested (Fig. 1A , right) with increasingly frequent subthreshold and target-absent trials (Fig. 1B) . Conditioned hallucinations occurred when subjects reported tones that were not presented, conditional upon the visual stimulus.
We recruited four groups of subjects ( Fig. 1C ): people with a diagnosed psychotic illness who heard voices (P+H+, n = 15); those with a similar illness who did not hear voices (P+H-, n = 14); an active control group who heard daily voices, but had no diagnosed illness (P-H+, n = 15) (13)-they attributed their experiences metaphyscially (supplementary materials) (14) ; and last, controls without diagnosis or voices (P-H-, n = 15).
Groups were matched demographically (tables S1 to S4). Rates of detection of tones at threshold were similar across groups. All groups demonstrated conditioned hallucinations. However, those with daily hallucinations endorsed more conditioned hallucinations than those without, regardless of diagnosis (F 1,55 = 19.59, P = 5.82 × 10 1D ). This effect remained after accounting for differences in detection thresholds (Fig. 1E, fig. S1 , and table S5). Group differences in propensity to report tones were observed only in the "no-tone" and 25% "likelihood of detection" conditions (intensity-byhallucination status F 3,165 = 13.59, P = 5.73 × 10 −4 ) (Fig. 1F) .
Participants also rated their decision confidence by holding down the response button (Fig. 1G) .
Participant confidence varied with stimulus intensity ("yes": R = 0.39, P = 7.46 × 10 −10 ; "no": R = 0.22, P = 9.02 × 10 −4 ). However, hallucinators were more confident in their conditioned hallucinations than nonhallucinators (F 1,53 = 6.50, P = 0.045). Both conditioned hallucinations and confidence correlated with hallucination severity outside of the laboratory (Fig. 1, H and I, and fig. S3 ).
In order to establish whether conditioned hallucinations involved true percepts, we first identified tone-responsive regions from thresholding runs [peaks at (-60, -20, 2) and (62, -28, 10)] (Fig.  2A) . As observed with elementary hallucinations (15) , activity in tone-responsive regions was greater during conditioned hallucinations compared with correct rejections (t 56 = 4.93, P = 7.59 × 10 −6 ) (Fig.  2B ). Electrical stimulation of this region in human patients produces AVH (16) . Taken together, these findings are consistent conditioned hallucinations involving actual perception.
Whole-brain analysis revealed that conditioned hallucinations also engaged anterior insula cortex (AIC), inferior frontal gyrus, head of caudate, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), auditory cortex, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Fig. 2C  and table S6) . A meta-analysis of symptom-capturebased studies examining neural activity of AVH highlighted similar regions (Fig. 2D) ACC responses frequently correlate with stimulus salience (18) . However, their activation before nearthreshold stimulus presentation predicts detection (19) . Caudate is engaged during audiovisual associative learning (20) . Likewise, AIC and ACC are engaged during multisensory integration (21) . There were no significant between-group differences in brain responses during conditioned hallucinations. However, hallucinators deactivated ACC more [peak at (-16, 54, 14) ; cluster-extent thresholded, starting value 0.005, critical cluster extent (k e ) = 99] during correct rejections compared with nonhallucinators ( Fig. 2, E and F) .
To further dissect conditioned hallucinations, we modeled their underlying computational mechanisms (Fig. 3A) using the hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF) (11) . We defined a perceptual model consisting of low-level perceptual beliefs (X 1 ), visualauditory associations (X 2 ), and the volatility of those associations (X 3 ), as well as evolution rates encoding the relationships between levels (w, q). Critically, our perceptual model allowed for variability in weighting between sensory evidence and perceptual beliefs (n). For n = 1, prior and observation have equal weight; for n > 1, the prior has more weight than that of the observation (strong priors); and for n < 1, the observation has more weight than that of the prior (weak priors). The resultant posterior probability of a tone is then fed to a separate response model.
Model parameters were fit to behavioral data, and the model was optimized by using log model evidence and simulations of observed behavior (figs. S3 and S4). Mean trajectories of perceptual beliefs were compared across groups (Fig. 3, B to D). Participants with hallucinations exhibited stronger beliefs at levels 1 (X 1 : F 11,605 = 4.8, P = 3.89 × 10 ) (Fig. 3C) . X 3 beliefs evolved less in those with psychosis, who failed to recognize the increasing volatility in contingencies (F 11,605 = 2.11, P = 0.018) (Fig. 3A) .
Consistent with strong-prior theory, n was significantly larger in those with hallucinations when compared with their nonhallucinating counterparts (Fig. 3E) , regardless of diagnosis (F 1,55 = 13.96, P = 4.45 × 10
−4
). Response model parameters did not differ across the groups (Fig. 3F) .
We regressed model parameters onto taskinduced brain responses (Fig. 4A) covaried with several conditioned hallucinationresponsive regions, including STS (table S7) . X 3 trajectories, by contrast, covaried with hippocampus/ parahippocampal gyrus and medial cerebellum (table S8) subjects with psychosis were significantly less sensitive to the changes in contingency as the task progressed. Psychotic symptoms are often associated with pathological rigidity. Belief-updating correlated with responses in the hippocampus and cerebellum. Hippocampal activity correlates with uncertainty in perceptual predictions (23) . The cerebellum has likewise been associated with production and updating of predictive models (24) . Our X 1 , X 2 , and n findings are consistent with a strong-prior theory of hallucinations. The X 3 findings in psychotic patients may reflect a strong prior that contingencies are fixed. On the other hand, they could reflect a weak prior on volatility. These beliefs were not associated with hallucinations but rather psychosis more broadly. Under chronic uncertainty, secondary to consistent belief violation, it may be adaptive to resist updating beliefs (25) .
Consistent with previous work applying signal detection theory (SDT) to AVH (26), we found liberal criteria and low perceptual sensitivity in our H+ groups. A liberal criterion may reflect poor reality monitoring (26) . However, meta-d' (a metric of participants' meta-cognitive sensitivity) did not differ significantly between groups ( fig. S6 ). SDT is a descriptive tool that does not distinguish aberrant perceptions from decisions. Our modeling work, however, localized group differences to the perceptual model alone. The prior weighting parameter (n) distinguished H+ from H-groups and also predicted confidence in conditioned hallucinations ( fig. S7 ). Our observations support an explanation of hallucinations based on strong perceptual priors. They suggest precision treatments for hallucinations, such as targeting cholinergically mediated priors (27) , and interventions to mollify psychosis more broadly, such as cerebellar transcranial magnetic stimulation (28) .
